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The making of ‘Boomergeddon’: The construction of the Baby Boomer 




The sociology of generations has attracted an awakened interest in recent years, 
sparked in part by high-profile media and policy discussions about the problem of the 
‘Baby Boomer’ generation. While this discussion tends to focus on resource issues 
arising from the existence of a relatively large cohort (for example, pensions and 
healthcare), it contains an implicit moral critique of the generation associated with the 
economic ‘boom’ of the Sixties. This article examines the development of the cultural 
script of the Baby Boomer problem in British newspapers over a 26-year period, to 
examine how shifts in the discourse about the Boomer generation relate to wider 




The problem of generations is, fundamentally, the mediation between past, 
present and future, where society is preserved, made anew, and at certain points 
transformed, by the ‘fresh contacts’ made by new members of society with the 
existing cultural heritage (Mannheim 1952). A generation’s social and historical 
location shapes its engagement with the wider trends of a particular epoch, and its 
association with that moment in history. Yet the development of Mannheim’s theory 
of generations within a wider sociology of knowledge also indicates that 
‘generationalism’ – ‘the systematic appeal to the concept of generation in narrating 
the social and political’ (Wohl 1980, in White 2013: 216) – cannot be considered 
narrowly, as a description of the historical experience of particular birth cohorts: it 
should also be understood as a way of thinking and knowing. The social and cultural 
trends of the present day shape the way we think about certain generations, and the 
import of the concept itself.  
 
In recent years, the generation known as the ‘Baby Boomers’ has become 
linked to a range of social problems in political, public, and media debate. Phillipson 
et al. (2008) find that ‘boomers are being constructed as a “problem generation”’, and 
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are ‘depicted, variously, as bringing new lifestyles and attitudes to ageing and 
retirement; or heralding economic disaster; or placing fresh burdens on health and 
social care services’ (Phillipson et al. 2008: para 5.2, abstract). White (2013) writes 
that ‘Today’s social problems’ are conceptualised as ‘the problems of generations’: in 
public debate over ‘baby boomers’ and the ‘jilted generation’, ‘problems of debt, 
access to higher education, housing, pensions, and the health of the environment are 
all routinely denominated in generational terms’ (White 2013: 216).   
 
This paper suggests that the generation known as the ‘Baby Boomers’ carries 
an association with the historical moment of the Sixties; indeed, it is also referred to 
in the literature as the ‘Sixties generation’ (Edmunds and Turner 2002). The 
contemporary cultural script of the Baby Boomer problem represents, in part, a 
critique of the cultural turn of the Sixties, which appears to be personified by the 
Boomer generation. At the same time, anxieties about the recent global economic 
crisis, and the apparent unsustainability of the postwar welfare state, have focused 
concern on to the size of the Baby Boomer cohort, and the impact of this may have on 
pensions, health, and social care services (Pifer and Bronte 1986, Walker 1996, 
Walker and Naegele 1999). The dynamic here can be situated within the context of a 
wider ‘demographic consciousness’, which (over)emphasises the significance of both 
absolute and relative numbers of older people (Furedi 1997, Mullan 2000). 
 
The fusion, in recent years, of the representation of the Boomer generation as 
a cultural and as an economic problem is illuminated by the cultural trope of 
‘Boomergeddon’. This emerged in media reports in 2006 to express a view of the 
Boomers as both a large and ageing cohort, and a generation associated with selfish, 
hedonistic, reckless behaviour. Below, we examine the features of this cultural trope, 




This paper is based on a study of the construction of the Baby Boomer problem in 
Britain between the years 1986 and 2011. The study design drew on two distinct, but 
related, branches of cultural sociology. The first was the concept of a ‘cultural script’ 
(Swidler 1986, 2001; Swidler and Arditi 1994; Bellah et al. 1996; Hochschild 2003), 
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and aimed to uncover ‘the way culture is used’ (Swidler 2001: 5, emphasis in 
original) in definitions of and discussions about the Baby Boomer generation. The 
second was Best’s (2008) elaboration of the role of claimsmaking and rhetoric in the 
construction of the ‘social problems process’, and aimed to identify the relationship(s) 
between the cultural script of the Baby Boomer problem and the wider contextual 
dynamics that helped to shape this script, and to give it wider purchase and 
prominence.  
 
A Qualitative Media Analysis (QMA) was conducted of articles published in 
the national British press over the period 1986-2011. QMA blends ‘the traditional 
notion of objective content analysis with participant observation to form 
ethnographic content analysis, or how a researcher interacts with documentary 
materials so that specific statements can be placed in the proper context for analysis’ 
(Altheide 1996: 2, emphasis in original). QMA draws on critical discourse analysis 
techniques familiar from literary theory, and applied effectively as a method for social 
science research by Fairclough (2000, 2003); however, it is an interactionist method, 
which sits within the ‘contextual constructionist’ approach to the analysis of social 
problems (Berger and Luckmann 1991, Best 2008).  
 
The date period 1986-2011 was chosen for two main reasons. First, analysing 
the development of the cultural script of the Baby Boomer problem over time allows 
us to identify subtleties and contradictions that may not appear when focusing on 
shorter timeframes. Other studies of the construction of the Baby Boomer problem in 
Britain, such as that by Phillipson et al. (2008), have affirmed that the media provides 
an important vehicle for shaping and disseminating claims and anxieties about this 
generation. The current study was able to build on these observations about the 
present day and look further backwards to see how the script developed.  
 
In the early 1970s, the Boomers, as the ‘Sixties generation’ associated with a 
period of major cultural upheaval and political radicalism, were the subject of a vast 
amount of academic study and commentary about the new problems confronting, and 
posed by, youth (Bristow 2015). In the study presented here, the period 1986-2011 
encapsulates the changing discussion of the Boomers from the point at which the 
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eldest Boomers reached the ‘middle age’ of 40 to the point at which they reach the 
‘Third Age’ of recent retirement.  
 
Second, the Nexis newspaper database includes articles from 1985 onwards; 
and the use of one database allows for a more stable collection of data than reliance 
on different newspaper-specific searches. This study used Nexis to search for articles 
across the national British press using the terms ‘baby’ and ‘boomer’. Theoretical 
sampling techniques (Altheide 1996: 18-23) were employed to narrow down the 
number and range of newspapers studied, while retaining the ability to analyse the 
development of the cultural script over time, across newspapers of different political 
persuasions, and in both the broadsheet and tabloid press. These techniques comprised 
coding an initial dataset by theme using NVivo (Version 9) to gain an understanding 
of the range of discussions; searching across the available range of national 
newspapers to find ‘peaks’ in the number of mentions of the Baby Boomers; selecting 
a range of four broadsheet and tabloid newspapers that might be expected to present 
different perspectives; and selecting the ‘most relevant’ 10 per cent of articles, as 
defined by the Nexis search, from the later date periods, when the large number of 
articles found precluded a detailed analysis of the whole dataset.  
 
The final dataset consisted of samples drawn from the Times, the Guardian 
(and Observer), the Daily Mail (and Mail on Sunday) and the Mirror (and Sunday 
Mirror), from the date periods 1986-7, 1992-3, 1998-9, 2006-7, 2008-9, and 2010-11. 
The searches over these date periods generated a total of 1,747 articles, of which 268 
were analysed in depth.  
   
Findings: The making of Boomergeddon 
 
Initial searches resulted in four observations. First, media interest in the Baby Boomer 
generation has grown over time. Second, newspaper articles link the Baby Boomers to 
a range of social issues and personality attributes, from health issues to sexual 
behaviours to a distinct set of cultural interests. Third, the particular issues or 
attributes that come to be linked to the Baby Boomers are related to the political, 
social and cultural context in which the article in question was written.  
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The fourth finding, and the focus of this paper, is that while the Baby Boomer 
generation has been of some interest to newspapers for a number of years, and some 
periods (for example, 1992-3) reveal particularly high levels of commentary about 
this generation, it is only in recent years that the Boomers have been constructed 
predominantly as a problem in the mainstream press. To put it another way: it is only 
since about 2006 that the cultural script of the Baby Boomers has hardened into the 
(overall) consensus that this generation ‘took their children’s future’ (Willetts 2010) 
and has ‘trashed’ the ‘wonderful inheritance’ of the welfare state (Beckett 2010b).  
 
It should be emphasised that the cultural script of the Baby Boomer problem is 
far from stable: indeed in certain periods, the tone of the coverage is generally 
positive about the Boomers, and represents the ‘Sixties generation’ as a solution to the 
social problems of that time, rather than their cause. This reflects the existence of 
much literature and commentary that has emphasised positive characteristics or 
behaviours attributed to this generation. Such literature in turn reflects the wider 
discourse about ageing, which has been informed both by an acknowledgement of the 
‘Third Age’ (Laslett 1989) as a recent, demographically and culturally significant 
feature in the life course, broadly reflecting social progress and enhanced life 
expectancy; and also by a more pessimistic outlook emphasising the problem of 
changes in the dependency ratio, and pressures on pensions and health care systems 
(Mullan 2000, Pifer and Bronte 1986).  
 
The attributes associated with the Baby Boomers identified in the media 
discussion also reflect a shift in wider sensibilities about the political and cultural 
developments that have come to be associated with the Boomer generation. For 
example, in the late 1980s, relatively few articles appeared discussing the Baby 
Boomers, and these tended to associate them with the music and counter-culture of 
the Sixties, musing on the fate of this self-consciously youthful generation as its eldest 
members approach their forties (Turner 1986a,b,c, Times).  
 
By 1992-3, we can see a clear ‘spike’ in the number of articles mentioning the 
Baby Boomers. This is accounted for by the election of President Bill Clinton in the 
USA, which is widely reported as a ‘generational’ election with great significance for 
Britain: ‘The Baby Boomers come of age’ (Guardian 1992); it is ‘Woodstock in 
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Washington’ (Macintyre 1992, Times). Media reports at this time display some 
ambivalence about how a generation known for its opposition to established forms of 
culture and politics will fare as the political elite: ‘Now it’s their turn to rule… but 
what, you might wonder, do you do as a sequel to 12 years of protest?’ (Palmer 1993, 
Mail on Sunday).  
 
The cultural script of the Baby Boomers in the early 1990s draws on the 
historical association of the ‘Sixties generation’ with radical politics, and positions 
this generation, in middle age, as heralding a shift away from the ‘old’ politics of left 
and right (Giddens 1994). The overall tone is one of cautious optimism about the 
‘political legitimation of the cultural advances ushered in by the sixties’ (Guardian 
1992) that Clinton’s election was widely perceived to represent.  
 
By 2010, however, the overall tone of the cultural script is overwhelmingly 
negative. This in part reflected the publication of three high-profile British books: The 
Pinch: How the baby boomers took their children’s future – and why they should give 
it back, by government minister David Willetts; Jilted Generation: How Britain Has 
Bankrupted its Youth, by journalists Ed Howker and Shiv Malik, writing in their late 
twenties; and What Did the Baby Boomers Ever Do For Us – How the children of the 
sixties lived the dream and failed the future, by left-leaning playwright Francis 
Beckett. A further pamphlet – It’s All Their Fault, by Neil Boorman, described by 
Machell and Lewy (2010) in the Times as ‘[a]s much a screed as analysis’ – gained 
some attention by virtue of being published at the same time. All four books ‘seek to 
explain the political, social and economic factors that have combined to create the 
unusual (and for many, difficult) situation where parents seem to have had it better 
than their children. Some try to apportion blame’ (Machell and Lewy 2010). 
  
The influence of claimsmakers such as David Willetts on the present-day 
discourse indicates the extent to which the presentation of the Baby Boomer problem 
is, by this point, explicitly endorsed and shaped by the political elite. The impact of 
ideas about intergenerational conflict on the formulation of policy in the USA, Europe 
and Britain has been noted for some years (Walker 1990, 1996; Walker and Naegele 
1999), and the development of such policy is discussed further below.  
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What is distinct about the period between 2006 and 2011, however, is the 
extent to which this policy trajectory comes together with wider cultural, 
demographic, and economic concerns to create a media discourse that is one-sidedly 
hostile to the Baby Boomer generation. This is exemplified by the motif of 
‘Boomergeddon’.  
 
2006: The coming of Boomergeddon 
 
In 2006, cultural commentator James Harkin was already writing in the Guardian 
about ‘a thundering backlash’ against the familiar, affectionate stereotypes of the 
Boomers as a generation associated with good times and good music: 
 
‘Balding, Wrinkled and Stoned’ was the less-than-flattering strapline for a 
Time magazine last month, one which painted a picture of a generation whose 
continued proclivity for illicit drugs is embarrassing even their children. In a 
barrage of new books, too, social critics from both right and left are taking aim 
at the new middle-aged. (Harkin 2006) 
 
Harkin’s article is titled ‘Boomergeddon’, named after ‘the not-too-subtle working 
title of a new book being written by the American sociologist Mike Males’. In 2006-7, 
the phrase ‘Boomergeddon’ recurs in British media discussions of the Baby Boomers; 
and analysis of the articles using it reveal three interesting features.  
 
First, there is no record of a book of this title published by Mike Males: 
indicating a high level of receptivity in the British press to the American cultural trope 
of ‘Boomergeddon’, before the critique itself was published (indeed, if it ever was). 
(Searches did reveal a book by James A. Bacon published in 2010, titled 
Boomergeddon: How Runaway Deficits Will Bankrupt the Country and Ruin 
Retirement for Ageing Baby Boomers – And What You Can Do About It, and 
promoting a rather different theme.) Second, this is a discussion that begins in the 
USA, which is then imported into the UK via commentary on the Baby Boomers in 
Britain: despite the markedly different demographic and social characteristics of the 
Boomers on each side of the Atlantic. Third, the trope of Boomergeddon fuses 
anxieties about the demographic and economic impact of the Boomer generation 
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approaching retirement with a moralised cultural critique of the attitudes and 
behaviours associated with the Sixties generation.  
 
Backlash against the Sixties: The Boomers as a cultural problem  
 
Two months after Harkin reported on Mike Males’s ‘Boomergeddon’ claim in the 
Guardian, the trope appears as central to essay by the commentator Melanie Phillips 
in the Daily Mail. Phillips begins with similar observations to Harkin: there is a 
‘renaissance’ in live rock concerts ‘fuelled in large measure by middle-aged fans – the 
“baby-boomer” generation born in the great surge of procreation and optimism that 
took place between the end of World War II and the early Sixties’. She continues: 
 
This is the generation that, through its sheer numbers and awesome purchasing 
power, has forged the culture of the post-war Western world in its own image. 
It is also a generation, I would argue, that is gripped by the need 
perpetually to rebel. But now there is a backlash. (Phillips 2006) 
 
Phillips briefly outlines Mike Males’s claim, which contrasts the Boomers’ alleged 
degeneracy with the responsible behaviour of the young:  
 
Californian boomers, he says, suffer staggeringly high levels of drug abuse, 
imprisonment and family instability. They have the worst rate of violent death; 
fatal drug overdoses between the ages of 40 and 60 have increased by 200 per 
cent over the past 35 years; and more and more of them have Aids. 
The young, meanwhile, who are demonised by their parents’ 
generation and subjected to overwhelming and unnecessary restrictions, are 
moderating their smoking, drinking and drug use, while school dropout rates, 
youth crime and teenage pregnancies and suicides are all down. The 
generation blame game has flipped on its head. (Phillips 2006) 
 
The notion that the ‘normal’ generational pattern has ‘flipped on its head’, with the 
young now taking responsibility for their dissolute elders, is the image that is later 
proffered by David Willetts in his introduction to The Pinch: 
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We all know the story. The parents return home from a night away to find a 
teenage party has got out of hand and the house has been trashed. Every few 
months a particularly dramatic episode gets into the media – with distraught 
parents tidying up a mess left by a swarm of young people summoned on 
Facebook. It plays to a deep-seated fear that younger people will not 
appreciate and protect what has been achieved by the older generation. This is 
the eternal anxiety of each generation about what comes after. But what if, 
when it comes to many of the big things that matter for our futures, it is the 
other way round? What if it’s actually the older generation, the baby boomers, 
who have been throwing the party and leaving behind a mess for the next 
generation to sort out? (Willetts 2010: xv) 
 
The metaphor of the Baby Boomers having thrown a ‘party’ and expecting their 
children to clear up the ‘mess’ continually recurs in the cultural script of the Baby 
Boomer problem, as a shorthand way of expressing a variety of related ideas. It 
represents the claim that British society in 2010 is experiencing a reversal of the 
normal pattern of generational continuity and conflict, in which the older generation 
worries about the extent to which their successors will appreciate and conserve 
society’s gains and achievements. In Willetts’s argument, things today appear to be 
‘the other way round’, where it is the older generation that has ‘trashed’ the 
metaphorical house, and the younger generation is left with the task of restoring order 
to chaos.  
 
The chaos, or ‘mess’, of the present day is conceptualised as the outcome of 
the turmoil of the Sixties – in particular, the questioning of established norms and 
values, and the heightened focus on the self (Jenkins 2006, Lasch 1979, Marwick 
1999). In the cultural script of the Baby Boomer problem, these trends are considered 
to be personified by the Boomers, and now they are allegedly taking their toll: on the 
bodies of the Boomers as they reach retirement age; on their children, who bear the 
brunt of having to ‘clear up the mess’; and on the wider social fabric.  
 
 Phillips acknowledges that ‘huge and complex cultural trends such as family 
breakdown, sexual licence or drug-taking can’t all be laid at the boomers’ door’. 
Nonetheless, she makes a clear argument that affluence and peace-time are intimately 
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linked to the narcissism and nihilism of the Baby Boomers, ‘the generation which still 
marched behind the banners of the ultrafeminist, family-smashing, bourgeois-hating 
radical politics of the Sixties in which they had grown up’. For Phillips, it was the 
‘unprecedented prosperity’ of the Boomers that gave them: 
 
…the means finally to flesh out trends going back to the 19th century, arising 
from the collapse of religious belief and the emergence of a doctrine of radical 
individualism. This had been held in check by the national emergencies of two 
world wars and a world depression, but after 1945 there was no longer any 
impediment to letting rip with a cult of ‘me’, a licence to be irresponsibly self-
indulgent and never grow up. (Phillips 2006) 
 
In Phillips’s account, the circumstances that allowed the Baby Boomers to have ‘so 
much influence’ also help to explain why they have ‘used it to such socially 
destructive ends’.  
 
 Harkin offers a further example from the ‘barrage of new books’ criticising the 
Baby Boomers. This is Balsamic Dreams, by the American satirist Joe Queenan 
(2001), which ‘accuses baby boomers of self-importance, narcissism and selling out’, 
and was published in the UK in February 2006: 
 
The boomers, [Queenan] argues, lived it up on state subsidies in their salad 
days and are now determined to kick away the ladder of social security for 
everyone else. Their determination to be different, he says, has turned sour and 
embarrassing. He pokes fun, for example, at the way in which American 
boomers are customising their own funeral services into a mixture of stand-up 
comedy and karaoke. (Harkin 2006) 
 
Phillips also references Queenan, and transposes his observations onto the British 
context:  
 
With their children departed and the mortgage paid off, [the Baby Boomers’] 
spending power is greater than that of any other age group. They use it to 
pump up their lips and suck out their thighs, go trekking in Peru and work out 
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in the gym, eat organic food and irrigate their colon to cheat death and 
anticipate several more decades of looking after Me. 
They claim credit for all the good things that have developed in the 60 
years of their existence – greater tolerance, an end to racial discrimination, a 
kinder, gentler, more compassionate world. 
But presented with any of the bad things – the shattering of the family, 
the breakdown in civility, feral children, the drug epidemic, the burgeoning of 
mental illness among the young, increasing contempt for the aged – they 
savagely disclaim any responsibility. (Phillips 2006) 
 
In this way, humorous reflections on Baby Boomer excess, as in Queenan’s book or 
the cult British sit-com Absolutely Fabulous, have become the metaphor for more 
serious critiques of social breakdown, perceived political mismanagement, and 
economic crisis (Vine 2008, 2010; Sandbrook 2010). This reveals the extent to which 
perceptions and quasi-fictional representations of ‘Boomer culture’ have come to 
serve the function of a metaphorical ‘hook’ on which to hang social criticism in the 
present day. However, such criticism has much deeper roots than a simple distaste for 
the caricatured hedonists of Balsamic Dreams or Ab Fab. Below, we consider some of 
the deeper anxieties that inform claims about ‘Boomergeddon’.  
 
Demographic consciousness: The Boomers as an economic problem 
Beyond the commentaries by Harkin and Phillips, the Boomergeddon trope plays a 
role in framing some of the more concrete events indicating the potential problems 
allegedly caused by an ageing population. For example, in October 2006, the Times 
published an article under the headline ‘Golden State faces Boomergeddon as “me 
generation” turns it grey’ (Philp 2006), which brings together the elements of the 
cultural critique discussed by Harkin and Phillips with an upcoming pensions crisis in 
the USA. Catherine Philp begins by stating that California ‘is a land synonymous with 
all things youthful, from golden beach babes and surfer dudes to twenty-something 
dotcom millionaires and aspiring young starlets’; but this image is ‘to be turned 
upside down in the coming decade as a tidal wave of retiring baby boomers turns it 
 11 
from the Golden State to the greyest’, with the state’s ‘senior population set to double 
by 2020’ (Philp 2006).  
 
 Philp goes on to argue that the Baby Boomers’ reluctance to face the prospect 
of growing old will have negative consequences for that generation and for others:  
 
While they may have been the wealthiest generation, they have also been the 
highest-spending, enjoying lavish lifestyles their parents could only dream of. 
Few have saved adequately for a retirement that may last as long as 
their working lives. Yet only a third say they expect to scale back their 
lifestyle. And while past generations may have had their own health problems, 
baby boomers are bringing a whole new set into their senior years, refusing to 
let go of their old ways of sex, drugs and rock’n’roll. (Philp 2006) 
 
While Phillips emphasised the negative health consequences of the Boomers’ 
‘rock’n’roll’ lifestyle, Philp argues that it is in fact, ‘For all those ageing rockers… 
there are many more baby boomers that have been dutifully eating their granola and 
practising their yoga. But their longevity is likely to be an equal burden on society’:  
 
‘Living longer will bring more chronic illnesses,’ says Patty Berg, the chair of 
the Californian assembly’s committee on ageing, which faces the task of 
preparing for the onslaught of retiring baby boomers. Half of those who live 
past 85 can expect to develop dementia. 
‘The challenges are going to be enormous. No state has ever seen a 
demographic shift like this. There is no roadmap because it’s never happened 
before.’ (Philp 2006) 
 
One of the starkest manifestations of the way that the interests of the younger and 
older generations are presented as being in conflict can be described as the ‘paradox 
of longevity’. This is the claim that the improvements in health, wealth and wellbeing 
that have characterised the generation born in the aftermath of the Second World War 
are themselves problematic, as they result in people living for longer, often managing 
chronic health conditions, and requiring sustained support from health and social care 
systems. While this has been a feature of concerns about ageing in general, it takes a 
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particularly moralised form in relation to the Baby Boomers, where the problems of 
the economy and the welfare state are represented as the problems of expectation and 
lifestyle, and attached to a generation that is culturally associated with hedonistic 
behaviours. ‘They were the first to enjoy free health care, and had the time of their 
lives in the Swinging Sixties,’ writes Fiona MacRae (2009) in the Daily Mail. ‘But the 
post-war “baby boomers” are now paying the price’.  
 
 The cultural script of the Baby Boomer problem can also be seen as 
expressing a ‘paradox of prosperity’. Here, the hedonism and anti-conventionalism 
associated with the Boomers is presented both as an unhappy outcome of (relative) 
prosperity, and a cause of the economic and cultural problems facing societies today. 
Thus, Melanie Phillips contends that ‘the boomers’ chickens are coming home to 
roost’. ‘Social irresponsibility is a luxury that is possible only at a time of peace and 
prosperity,’ she writes: 
 
But with the nation’s security and tranquillity now threatened from within and 
without, the boomers are getting anxious. So they are beginning to rethink 
issues such as social cohesion, patriotism and the culture of grievance. But the 
barren landscape that is now causing them such unease is the one they 
themselves have laid waste. (Phillips 2006) 
 
For Will Hutton, former editor of the Observer, ‘[t]he story of the past six 
decades is in many ways the story of how we threw off our shackles only to discover 
that we do need some constraints’; and [t]he debate in the years ahead will not be 
about how to continue with our baby boomer liberalism, but over how and where we 
need restraint around some shared principles and rules’ (Hutton 2010). While the 
critiques contain some differences in tone and example, Hutton, along with Francis 
Beckett (2010) and other left-leaning critics of what is regarded as the Baby Boomer 
legacy, appears to regard the impact of the Sixties as just as ‘destructive’ (Hutton 
2010) as does Melanie Phillips.  
 
There is a large and varied body of literature about the Sixties and its legacy, 
as there is about the phenomenon of ageing. I do not intend to dispute many of the 
insights contained in this literature about some of the problematic aspects of a 
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developing ‘culture of narcissism’ (Lasch 1979), or the new questions that arise for 
social policy in engaging with the reality of ageing societies. The concern, here, is 
about the consequences of a cultural and policy discourse that presents a large, 
diverse, and living generation as the personification of a complex set of social 
problems.  
 
Discussion: The cross-national diffusion of the Baby Boomer problem  
 
One striking feature of the current ‘generationalism’ is that the experience of the Baby 
Boomers is presented as homogenous, both within the Boomer generation itself and 
between the Boomers in Britain and those in the USA. From the election of President 
Clinton onwards, this elision of quite different experiences emerges as a notable 
feature of the construction of the Baby Boomer problem in Britain. This speaks to the 
way that generationalism, as a way of thinking, can ‘mask diversity’ in experience 
(White 2013) and, indeed, lead to inaccurate assumptions about historical and 
demographic change. It is also reflects the ‘cross-national diffusion’ (Best 2001) of 
claims about the Baby Boomer problem from the USA, where this problem was first 
constructed, to the UK.  
 
 The term ‘Baby Boomer’ carries with it two meanings. The first relates to a 
rise in the birthrate was experienced across North America, Europe, and Australia in 
the aftermath of the Second World War. However, there were national variations in 
the pattern taken by this ‘baby boom’. Ian Jack (2011), writing in the Guardian, notes 
that the ‘baby boomer generation’ is ‘a term borrowed from America and quite 
wrongly applied to the postwar pattern of British birth rates. (Not until 1975 were as 
few babies born as in 1945; more British babies were born between 1956 and 1966 
than in the so-called boomer decade of 1945 to 1955.)’ The demographer Jane 
Falkingham (1997: 19-21) confirms that there were two ‘baby booms’ in Britain, in 
comparison to the more ‘pronounced’ rises in the crude birth rate that took place in 
the USA, Canada, Australia and France. Yet in the present-day cultural script, the 
demographic characteristics of the British Baby Boomer generation are continually 
elided with those of their American counterparts: as in Willetts’ definition of the 
‘boomers’ as ‘roughly those born between 1945 and 1965’ (Willetts 2010a: xv). This 
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leads to an exaggeration of the demographic pressures imposed by retiring Baby 
Boomers in Britain.   
 
The linking of the Baby Boomers to economic problems (and solutions) is 
most clearly expressed in the claim about ‘intergenerational equity’, which forms the 
basis of Willetts’s argument about the emergence of an ‘economic generation gap’ 
(Willetts 2010b, Times) and his claim that the Boomers have taken ‘their children’s 
future’ and need to find ways of giving it back. The concept of intergenerational 
equity has a history, which again began in the USA. Marshall et al. (1993) explain 
that it emerged in the USA in 1984, and credit this development to the publication, in 
the journal Demography, of Samuel H. Preston’s Presidential Address to the 
Population Association of America (‘Children and the Elderly: Divergent Paths for 
America’s Dependents’). Preston (1984) argued that the impact of ‘several decades of 
abrupt demographic change’ in the USA was the deterioration of conditions for 
children and the ‘dramatic’ improvement of conditions for the growing elderly 
population (Preston 1984: 435-6).  
 
 The wider impact of Preston’s thesis, including the formation of the 
organisation Americans for Generational Equity (AGE), reflects the influence of 
demographic consciousness in debates about economic development in the late 
twentieth century. Furedi (1997) contends that in debates about population growth and 
demographic change, ‘Statements about numbers are often driven by another agenda, 
which is not readily apparent’ (Furedi 1997: 12-13): and this is striking with regard to 
the growing consensus that ‘intergenerational equity’ is a key issue for the twenty-
first century.  
 
As Alan Walker (1996) explains, ‘for largely ideological reasons, an 
economic-demographic imperative has been manufactured in some countries, with the 
aid of international economic agencies, to facilitate the restructuring of their welfare 
states’. Against this ideological backdrop, the ‘“renegotiation”’ of the social contract 
– in particular, as it pertains to public pensions – has, at least in Britain and EU 
countries, ‘little or nothing to do with “intergenerational” conflict’ (Walker 1996: 11). 
Rather, Walker argues, ‘the “intergenerational equity” debate should be regarded as a 
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socio-political construct’, which is employed as part of a wider ideological assault on 
the principles and structures of state welfare systems.  
 
The danger of ‘generationalism’ as a frame for social policy is that social and 
economic problems become re-presented as the problem of people: in the words of 
one headline, ‘Too many, too old?’ (Moorhead 1987, Times) This assumption is, in 
turn, used to frame contemporary claims that, in the words of Times economics editor 
Anatole Kaletsky, ‘This is the age of war between the generations’. For Kaletsky, the 
trigger for the current economic crisis was the ‘huge liability, which governments 
have assumed for the baby-boomers’ future pension and health costs, that makes 
public finances all over the world truly unsustainable’. Indeed, the economic crisis is 
itself presented as a demographic one:  
 
From this point of view, the true significance of the 2007-09 financial crisis 
and bailouts was not to make public debts unsustainable, but simply to bring 
forward by about a decade the unsustainability caused by the ageing of the 
baby-boomer. (Kaletsky 2010, Times)  
 The term ‘Baby Boomer’ also encapsulates the paradox of prosperity. It refers 
to the experience of the post-war economic boom – and here again, there are 
significant differences in the experiences of Baby Boomers in Britain and America, 
and within the generations themselves. Whereas the Second World War was followed 
in the USA by a significant period of economic growth, Britain remained in the grip 
of national debt and rationing. As the American satirist P. J. O’Rourke remarks in his 
introduction to the UK edition of The Baby Boom: How It Got That Way, And It 
Wasn’t My Fault, And I’ll Never Do It Again, ‘postwar experience in America was 
very different from postwar experience in a place where war, in fact, occurred. That 
is, we had the “post-” and you had the war’ (O’Rourke 2014: loc. 77:3510). Even the 
wealthiest British Boomers were not reared in the post-war affluence associated with 
their US counterparts; and on both sides of the Atlantic, the largest proportion of the 
Baby Boomer cohort(s) is not wealthy, and never has been.  
In this respect, too, the label of ‘Baby Boomer’ has the effect of flattening out 
arguably more significant national and social divisions between individuals who 
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happened to be born at the same time. The demographic character of the ‘Baby 
Booms’ in Britain is very different to that of the USA, as is the structure of its welfare 
system. Yet as the ‘Boomergeddon’ motif exemplifies, the British media discourse of 
the Baby Boomer problem has eagerly ‘borrowed’ the features of the US debate to 
frame the discussion in the UK. 
Meanwhile, research within the UK consistently highlights the diversity of 
fortune and experience within the Baby Boomer generation, and the extent to which 
people’s experience within later life is shaped by factors of social class, income 
inequality, employment, (ill) health, gender, ethnicity, and family support networks as 
much as, if not more than, by their generational location (see Leach 2007, Phillipson 
2013, Pilcher 1995). Indeed, as Scherger et al. (2011) suggest, in their study of leisure 
activities and inequality in retirement, this challenges the idea that the ‘new old age’ 
has become a reality for most people:  
The Third Age as imagined by Laslett (1987, 1996/1989), a time of new 
activities and self-development, has not become reality, notwithstanding that 
the prospects of a continuing active lifestyle after retirement seem to be good 
for most retirees, and that some privileged groups come close to Laslett’s 
vision. (Scherger et al. 2011: 167) 
 
A similar argument about the gulf between ‘the myth and marketing of the new old 
age’, and the actual experience of aging in the US today, has been made by the US 
writer Susan Jacoby (2011), who describes today’s ‘received wisdom’ that growing 
old is merely a question of attitude as ‘a new, more subtle, but no-less-pernicious 
form of ageism’ than the stereotypically negative attitudes about old age (Jacoby 




The qualitative methods employed by this study enable us to grasp the interplay 
between social context and the way that, at particular times, the Baby Boomer 
generation is depicted and the significance that is accorded to its existence and 
actions. Following Mannheim (1952), we are able to see that the Boomers exist as a 
social generation, constituted by their engagement with the wider social forces 
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surrounding their coming-of-age. At the same time, the consciousness that this 
generation constitutes a social problem is informed by the wider social forces 
operating in the present day. The generationalism of today’s cultural script seeks to 
find causes and solutions to economic and cultural problems in the realm of ideas 
about generations and their individual members. 
 
Rather than encapsulating the experience of a particular generation or birth 
cohort, the term ‘Boomergeddon’ can be seen to combine an articulation of crisis 
thinking in relation to the economy and the social structures of the postwar period, 
with an overt statement of generational conflict. By the autumn of 2006, a number of 
core themes have already been played out around the fear of the consequences of the 
Baby Boomer generation reaching retirement. This discussion precedes the global 
financial crisis of 2007, but draws upon wider anxieties about state spending, the 
impact of an ageing population, and a perceived crisis of social control arising from 
the dominant outlook of the ‘Me Generation’ (Phillips 2006; Philp 2006; Wolfe 
1976).  
 
In this regard, we can suggest that pre-existing fears about the impact of an 
ageing population are moralised through a critique of the attributes and behaviours 
associated with a particular ageing generation. Simultaneously, a latent anxiety about 
the effects of the changes brought about by the Sixties are concretised through a focus 
on the economic and demographic pressures linked to a large cohort reaching 
retirement age. ‘Boomergeddon’ here appears as a politicised variant of the wider 
Baby Boomer discussion. Thus Philp concludes her article:  
 
‘(Baby boomers) are going to make some difficult demands on the younger 
generation,’ says Mr Males. ‘I predict open inter-generational warfare.’ 
That, at least, is something the baby boomers know about. (Philp 2006) 
 
As Walker (1990, 1996) and others have indicated, an important aspect of the 
construction of social policies around notions of inter-generational conflict derives 
from an ideological challenge to the postwar welfare state, in which claims about the 
problem of ‘inequity’ about the relations between generations have been marshalled 
to legitimise a renegotiation of the social contract. In this respect, claims about the 
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present-day problem of the Baby Boomers do not derive from public opinion: they 
have their roots in policy discourse in the USA, which later comes to be adopted in 
the UK. The study presented here has identified the way that, in recent years, these 
claims have gained more prominence in national British newspapers; a development 
that is significant in terms of promoting a re-framing of social problems in public 
discussion.  
 
This study does not speculate about the degree to which the cultural script of 
the Baby Boomer problem has been internalised. Given the extent to which 
individuals’ experience of generations remain powerfully shaped by affective bonds 
within the family, and by the persistence of (arguably more significant) inequalities of 
class, ethnicity and gender, we should not assume that the cultural script presented by 
newspapers is deeply shared by their readers. It is striking that concerns about inter-
generational conflict seems today to be incited primarily, not by younger generations 
themselves, but by opinion-formers within the political and cultural elites. However, 
the discourse of ‘Boomer blaming’ is no less benign for that.  
 
The failure of the rhetoric of the Baby Boomers to capture the factual reality 
of this generation’s existence leads us to conclude that this is a case of rhetoric in the 
absence of content. It relies on an a priori understanding of who the Sixties 
generation is, and the problems that it causes: an understanding partially borrowed 
from the discussion in the USA, where such claims have also been critiqued 
(Quadagno 1990, Rix 1990, Walker 1996). The character of the cultural script of the 
Baby Boomer problem should also give us pause, in revealing that what seems to be a 
critique of the Baby Boomers as a specific generation can, in fact, represent the 
mobilisation of envy and antagonism by the young against older generations in 
general: the theme of Ivan Turgenev’s classic 1862 novel Fathers and Sons. When, as 
White observes, generationalism becomes a ‘leading register of political discourse’ 
(White 2013: 217), its divisive consequences are quick to manifest themselves in 
claims about ‘open inter-generational warfare’ (Philp 2006) and an ‘age of war 
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